Power

I read Pedro Páramo decades ago and thought I had understood it: a haunted town, the dead murmuring to each other across timelines, memory rendered as fog. Returning to it now, a second book sits underneath the first one. Juan Rulfo’s novel is not only a feat of atmosphere. It is a social diagnosis — abuse, incest, patriarchal impunity, and the mechanism by which private violence hardens into public order. The setting is unmistakably Mexican. The grammar it describes is not. …

In 1966, at a symposium called “Man the Hunter,” the anthropologist Marshall Sahlins stood up with data other people had already collected — Richard Lee’s fieldwork among the Dobe Ju/‘hoansi of the Kalahari, the Arnhem Land studies from Australia — and said the quiet part out loud. Foragers routinely described as living at the ragged edge of subsistence were, in fact, meeting their needs on something like fifteen to twenty hours of work a week, and spending the rest of their waking hours resting, talking, and doing nothing in particular. Sahlins published the argument, expanded, in Stone Age Economics (1972) under a title designed to sting: “the original affluent society.” Not affluent because foragers had much, but affluent because they wanted little and got it without the compulsion the word “work” now implies. The finding embarrassed a whole civilizational story in which agriculture and industry had liberated humanity from want. They hadn’t. They had invented a new way of being busy, and then made the busyness feel like fate. …

Mercantilism, the economic doctrine that ran Europe from the sixteenth century to the eighteenth, held that a nation’s wealth was measured in bullion — gold and silver in the vault, full stop. It was a doctrine built around what a ledger could hold. A ship full of spices was wealth only once it had been converted into coin; a colony was valuable only for the specie it could be made to yield. Everything that could not be weighed, stamped, and entered into a column was, for accounting purposes, not there. Adam Smith spent much of The Wealth of Nations (1776) dismantling this confusion of gold with wealth, but the instinct behind it — count what can be counted, and treat the rest as noise — outlived the theory that named it. …

We are taught that the world runs on reasons. The best argument wins. The facts speak for themselves. Truth has a gravitational pull. Decisions—individual and collective—flow from rational calculation: costs weighed against benefits, evidence stacked against counterevidence, the strong claim vanquishing the weak. But history, observed coldly, tells a different story. What wins is not the truest argument but the most compelling fiction. The narrative that best captures attention, simplifies complexity into a hero-and-villain arc, and offers closure. The one that feels right rather than the one that is right. The story that promises meaning, belonging, and cosmic order beats the story that promises accuracy every time. …

You cannot kill a narrative by killing its bearer. This is the oldest lesson in the history of power, and it is still not learned. The jester speaks a truth the throne cannot tolerate. Power silences him. But the moment the silencing happens—the arrest, the exile, the execution—something shifts. The jester is no longer a living person you can contradict or embarrass. He becomes a martyr. He becomes untouchable. The public, having witnessed the drama, begins to resurrect him. In protest signs. In whispered stories. In the coded language of the oppressed. The throne meant to kill the jester. Instead, it created an eternal symbol. …

Wherever power gathers into a single pair of hands, a figure in motley appears beside it and begins to laugh. He is permitted what no one else is permitted: to mock the crowned head from arm’s length, to say over dinner what would cost a minister his own. We file the court jester under quaint medieval décor, somewhere between the falconry and the tapestry. He is nothing of the kind. He is a structural organ that grows wherever power concentrates — the way a callus grows where a tool keeps rubbing the hand — and he grows back long after we are sure we have abolished him. …

In the early twentieth century, advertising made a simple claim: This product performs this function. A soap cleaned; a car transported; a cigarette was tobacco rolled in paper. The transaction was rational, almost mechanical. You paid for utility. Then came Edward Bernays, and everything changed. Bernays was a Viennese emigrant, the nephew of Sigmund Freud, and he arrived in America bearing a dangerous insight from his uncle’s work: humans are not rational actors deciding between utilities. We are vessels of irrational impulse—unconscious desire, hidden fear, unexamined shame. We are, in a sense, predictable in our very irrationality. …

Benedict Anderson made a simple observation that took a century to reach mainstream consciousness: the nation — the thing we paint on our faces at sporting events, the cause we die for, the imagined container of culture and identity — is a social construct. Not in the soft postmodern sense where everything dissolves into relativity. In the precise engineering sense: it is a machine that someone built, for reasons, and the reasons printed on the package are not the actual reasons. …